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Higher Order Probabilities* 
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 
A number of writers have supposed that for the full specification of 
belief, higher order probabilities are required. Some have even 
supposed that there may be an unending sequence of higher order 
probabilities of probabilities of probabilities. . . . In the present paper 
we show that higher order probabilities can always be replaced by the 
marginal distributions of joint probability distributions. We consider 
both the case in which higher order probabilities are of the same sort 
as lower order probabilities and that in which higher order 
probabilities are distinct in character, as when lower order 
probabilities are construed as frequencies and higher order 
probabilities are construed as subjective degrees of belief. In neither 
case do higher order probabilities appear to offer any advantages, 
either conceptually or computationally. 
1. Subjective probabilities are often introduced into 
systems of artifical intelligence because it is clear that some 
sort of uncertainty is required, and because it is unclear how 
else to represent that uncertainty. "Subjective" is used 
ambiguously. It may mean only that probabilities are to be 
relativized to subjects: that is, that any two rational (ideal) 
subjects having the same evidence will agree on probabilities. 
(Cheeseman [1985] ) This corresponds to Keynes' notion of 
probability as a measure of rational belief (Keynes [1921] ) 
Or "subjective" may be meant in a stronger sense: that 
there are no rules of rationality that can compel even ideal 
observers, having exactly the same information, to agree on 
probability. This was Savage's view, for example. (Savage 
[1954] ) Many writers appear to have views more like 
Savage's than like Cheeseman's. This introduction of 
subjective probabilities in the strong sense, however, is quite 
often accompanied by a bad conscience: somehow we would 
like to have something better than mere subjective feeling to 
underlie our probabilities. 
One way of easing one's conscience about the 
difference between assigning a probability to a head on a toss 
of a coin, and assigning a probability to a person's choice of a 
tie to go with a suit, is to consider second order probabilities. 
Loosely speaking, one says that the former probability is 
much more certain than the latter. 
Savage himself admits to this feeling (pp. 57, 58) and 
30 
characterizes it as a distinction between probabilities of which 
one "feels sure" and those of which one doesn't. He dismisses 
the feeling as useless, except as a guide to the reyision of 
probabilities: When we find ourselves with degrees of belief 
that do not satisfy the probability calculus, we are moved to 
modify our degrees of belief; since there is no objectively 
correct way of proceeding to coherence, we do so in part by 
sacrificing probabilities about which we do not feel sure to 
probabilities about which we do feel sure. 
The question of the meaningfulness of higher order 
probabilities has been discussed by a number of distinguished 
writers, including Savage, in Marshak et al [1975 ] . Chaim 
Gaifman [1985 ] and Zoltan Domotor [1981] both consider 
higher order probabilities as a way of extending probability to 
take account of uncertainties about probabilities. Richard 
Jeffrey, for· whom probabilities are essentially derivable from 
preferences, considers higher order preferences (Jeffrey 
[1974 ] ) , from which one might think to get higher order 
probabilities. Brian Skyrms [1980a] , [1980b] argues that 
higher order probabilities are essential for a correct 
representation of belief. 
On the other hand, Cheeseman claims that " 
information about the accuracy of P is fully expressed by a 
probability density function over P . " As an article of faith, 
this has a plausible ring to it. But the systems of Domotor 
and Gaifman, come with semantics that allow one to have 
actual models of systems with higher order probabilities. So 
higher order probabilities can certainly exist and be 
distinguished formally from first order probabilities. Brian 
Skyrms [1980a] and Hugh Mellor [1980] argue that In 
addition, higher order probabilities can reflect 
psychological realities that cannot be reflected by first order 
probabilities, and provide one way among others for 
characterizing the "laws of motion" of belief change, or 
probability kinematics. 
For example, I might say that the probability that a 
coin will yield heads on a certain toss is "almost certainly" a 
half -- i. e. ,  that the probability that the probability is a 
half is very close to one. In contrast, I might say that the 
probability that a certain person will choose a blue tie, given 
that she is wearing a blue suit, is 0. 8, but I may be no 
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more than 50% confident of my probability judgement. That 
is, I might say that the probability that the probability is 
0. 8 is less than 0. 5. The second order probabilities reflect 
my willingness to change my first order probabilities in the 
face of new evidence. 
2. In order to explore the question of whether higher 
order probabilities are useful for applications in AI, it will be 
helpful to approach these matters formally. 
Let W be our set of worlds, w E W . Our initial 
or a priori probability function will be denoted by P. 
Disregarding considerations of higher order probabilities, our 
probability for a particular atom w is P(w) -- that 
represents the odds at which we would be willing to bet that 
w was the case. 
If we want to consider a second order probability, 
we must consider alternatives to our probability function P. 
(P can't be wrong unless something else is right! ) Let the 
second order probability function be denoted by PP. This is 
to be a classical probability function defined on a set :P of 
classical probability functions whose common domain is W . 
There is an important relation between the first order 
probability P and the second order probability PP . This 
has been noted by Jaynes [1958] , Skyrms [1980] , and 
others. The principle is that the first order probability P(w) 
must be equal to the expectation of the second order 
probability applied to first order probabilities: 
(1) P(w) = Xw PP(P) X Pi (w) - E[Pi (w)} 
To see that this must so, reflect that the agent, were these 
two quantities not the same, would be rationally obligated to 
bet against himself for arbitrarily high stakes. Or, less 
picturesquely, that a cunning bettor could take advantage of 
him. 
3. There are two positions to take from which the 
question of higher order probabilities might get different 
answers. First, we might suppose that all probabilities are 
essentially the same -- for example, are expectation-forming 
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operators. Second, we might suppose that we distinguish 
two or more varieties of probability, and that "higher order" 
reflects an ordering among these varieties. 
First, let us suppose that probability is univocal. If 
we construe probability univocally, then that probability 
must be the one we use for computing expectations, and, 
ultimately, for making decisions. Suppose we face a 
decision. The decision can be thought of as a choice from an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of acts A. Associated with each 
act A J and each world w is a utility U (AJ , w) . We suppose 
the sets of acts, worlds, and probability functions, to be 
finite, for the sake of simplicity. 
If we knew the "correct" probability function P* , 
the decision problem would be simple. We would just need 
to find an act A J such that no alternative act has a greater 
expected utility under P* . A J is a correct decision just in 
case for all k, 
(2) Xw P*(w) X U(A J , w) � 
X P*(w) X U(A k , w) w 
Since we don't know what P* is, however, we must turn to 
second order probability. (We leave to one side here the 
intriguing question of what it means for a first order 
probability to be "correct". ) PP(P), which we may 
abbreviate PP(i), is the second order probability that Pi 1s 
the correct first order probability. 
How does this change things? For one thing, it is 
clear that we get the same advice only if for every w , 
P(w) is equal to the expected value of Pi(w) , as we 
observed in (1) . In fact, this identity may be regarded as a 
constraint on second order probabilities. Our original 
equation (2), then, may be replaced by 
(3) Xi PP(P) X [ Xw Pi (w) X U(AJ, w) ] � 
Xi PP(P) X [ Xw Pi (w) X U(AJ ,w)] 
This yields, by a trivial manipulation of the sums, 
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(4) 2. PP(Pi) X Pi(w) X U(AJ· , w) :C 1, w 
2. PP(P) X Pi(w) X U(Ak, w) 
1, w 
But in (4) it is apparent that what we have been calling 
'first' and 'second' order probabilities are merely marginal 
probabilities of a distribution that we can represent as a 
probability distribution on R = P X W with probability 
element P'(<i,w>) = PP(i) X P(w) for <i,w> in P X W. 
Formally, this is no doubt the case. But is this just 
a formal trick? Can we make distinctive sense of the 
marginal probabilities that we are calling 'second order'?. 
(Remember that we are not interpreting them in a different 
way as probabilities. ) Since many joint probability 
distributions yield the same marginals, it is quite clear that 
there may be a loss of information in looking only at the 
marginal distributions. But we may also ask -- perhaps 
more importantly -- whether there is a computational 
advantage to this division of a joint probability distribution 
into the product of two marginal distributions. 
It turns out that we can express various useful 
things about the kinematics of certain marginal probabilities 
in terms of higher order probabilities. (This is reminiscent of 
the fact that in some special cases Dempster/Shafer 
conditionalization offers computational advantages over the 
convex Bayesian conditionalization of which it is a special 
case. ) Here is an example taken from Skyrms [1980b] . 
As is well known, Richard Jeffrey [1965] offers a 
procedure for updating a system of probabilities in response to 
a change in a given probability: If P( is an initial 
probability, a a particular proposition, P l' the final 
probability resulting from a shift exactly from P((a) to 
Pl'(a) under the assumption that for all b Pj"'(b/a) = 
P t* (b/a), then for any b , 
Pt*(b) - Pj"'(b/a)XPt*(a) + Pj"'(b/""a)XPt*(...,a) 
This relation follows from certain constraints on higher order 
probabilities (Skyrms [1980b] , appendix 2). The first two 
constraints essentially provide for the expected value 
condition we have already noted in (1) ; the third is this: 
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This is a principle that seems appropriate for some contexts 
(where the conditional probability is based on known 
statistics) but inappropriate for others (where the object of 
our inquiry is that very conditional probability) . 
The upshot of this discussion is that if we construe 
first and second order probabilities in the same way, there 1s 
a perfectly automatic procedure for representing them as a 
joint distribution in a common space, .but that it may 
involve a loss of information. There is no conceptual 
advantage to representing them as first and second order as 
opposed to joint. There may be a computational advantage. 
4. Most people who have written about higher order 
probabilities have had in mind different kinds of probabilities. 
Skyrms sometimes speaks of epistemic probabilities concerning 
relative frequencies or propensities, though he also talks of 
different orders of a given (epistemic) probability, as does D. 
H. Mellor [1980]. Domotor [1981] appears to consider a 
univocal notion of probability related to belief, but on close 
inspection the higher and lower order probabilities are not the 
same. Thus when we consider the probability that A 
attributes to the probability that B assigns to A's having a 
certain probability for a, (Domotor's type of example) , the 
probability functions are really all quite distinct. 
To see how higher order probabilities work in this 
case, let us return to our original example. But let us make 
it more concrete: let us suppose that the worlds w represent 
the different outcomes on the tenth toss of a die, and that 
the Pi represent the various ways in which it may be 
loaded. Thus each Pi is a sextuple of real numbers adding 
up to 1 that represent long-run relative frequencies or 
propensities, and PP(P) is the degree of belief we have in 
the loading represented by the first order probability. (For 
simplicity, we suppose that we are certain that the outcomes 
of the tosses are independent and identically distributed. ) 
This is about as clear a case as one can imagine in which the 
first and second order probabilities are of different kinds. 
Suppose we have to choose between two actions: 
e. g. , to bet at even money on the occurrence of a 'two' on 
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the tenth roll, or to abstain from betting. The 
computational procedure would be just that presented in 
section 2, despite the fact that the probabilities appear to be 
so different. We still can construct a product space, and a 
joint distribution over it. Is this just an artifact? Are we 
just mixing oil and water and calling it mayonnaise? 
A careful look at the example shows that we are 
not. What determines the utility of our act is not the 
relative frequency of two's in general, but the relative 
frequency of two's on the tenth roll -- i.e., whether there 
is one or not. The Pi 's give the long run frequency or the 
propensity of the die to yield two's, but they do not in 
general give the frequency of two's on the tenth toss. 
There are many circumstances under which a 
distribution such as that given by one of the Pi would 
determine the probability -- for example when we know 
that the toss in question is an ordinary toss (not one 
performed by someone who can control the outcome) , that it 
has not occurred yet, etc. The utility of an action under 
the assumption of a particular loading hypothesis will, under 
these circumstances, be determined by the the sextuple 
embodied in that hypothesis. But this is just an instance of 
what is traditionally called 'direct inference' from a statistical 
distribution to a degree of belief. The conditions under which 
direct inference is appropriate are just those under which it 
is appropriate to weight the possible outcomes of the tenth 
toss by the six numbers given by Pi 
This is not the place to develop this argument (it has 
been developed in various other places, e.g. [197 4] , [1985])  
but we can summarize it as follows: knowing a statistical 
distribution does not give us knowledge of the outcome of the 
tenth toss; it just indicates (sometimes) how to allocate our 
beliefs concerning the tenth toss. To choose among actions 
whose outcomes depend on specific events requires beliefs; the 
beliefs may depend on statistical knowledge. The second 
order probabilities PP(Pi) represent an allocation of our 
beliefs among the possibilities indexed by i . These may (or 
may not) in turn be based on some fqrm of statistical 
knowledge, but the source of probabilities is irrelevant" to the 
question of whether it makes sense to combine them in a 
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joint distribution. For a decision problem it clearly does 
make sense to combine them . 
5. The conclusion is that so-called second order 
probabilities have nothing to contribute conceptually to the 
analysis and reprePsentation of uncertainty. The same ends 
can be achieved more simply, and without the introduction 
of novel machinery, by combining "first" and "second" order 
probabilities into a joint probability space. This procedure 
does not even add complexity to the computation, if the 
marginal distributions are independent. This is the case 
whether or not those probabilities are thought of as being of 
different kinds. Peter Cheeseman's claim that "information 
about the accuracy of P is fully expressed by a probability 
density function over P , " [1985, p 1007] appears to be fully 
vindicated, if construe "over P" to refer to a space in which 
all of our information can be expressed. 
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